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LFacts
SamnyCystal Perkins ("Perkins") was tried for the first-degree murder and
first-degree rape of LaSheena Renae "Jojo" Moore ("Jojo").' On April 19,1992,
at approximately 3:00 a.m., Perkins mounted seven-year-old JoJo, covered her
face with a pillow, raped her, and suffocated her to death.2 A North Carolina
juryconvicted Perkins "under the theories of premeditation and deliberation and
felony murder."3 At the capital sentencing hearing, the jury found the three
aggravating circumstances submitted to be present.4 The jury found that six
mitigating circumstances existed, "but concluded that the mitigating circum-
stances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances" and returned a death
verdict.' The trial court then sentenced Perkins to death for the first-degree
murder conviction and to life imprisonment for the first-degree rape conviction.6
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld Perkins's convic-
tion and sentence of death. After the United States Supreme Court denied his
petition for writ of certiorari, Perkins filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief
("MAR") in Pitt CountySuperior Court.! Perkins claimed that he was denied his
1. Perkins v. Lee, No. 02-25,2003 WL 21729943, at *1 (4th Cir.July25, 2003) (opinion not
selected for publication). JoJo was the granddaughterof Theia Esther Moore, a woman Perkins had
known for ten or eleven years and had been dating for two months. Id
2. Id
3. Id at "2.
4. Id The juryfound: "(1) Perkins had been previouslyconvicted of a felonyinvolving the
use or threat of violence; (2) Perkins committed the murder while engaged in the commission of
or an attempt to commit first-degree rape; and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
crueL" Id
5. Id; seeN.C GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (2001) (stating that the jury shall deliberate and
render a sentence based upon consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances); N.C
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c) (stating that the jury may recommend death when the mitigating
circumstances are "insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances"); State v. Perkins, 481
S.E2d 25, 28 (N.C 1997) (discussing the jury's decision to sentence the defendant to death).
6. Perkim, 2003 WL 21729943, at *2.
7. Id; ssePerkbr, 481 S.E.2d at 31, 34 (holding in part that prospective jurors' responses to
death-qualification questions justified challenges for cause and that no outside influence was exerted
on the jury).
8. Perkis, 2003 WL 21729943, at *2; sw N.C GEN. STAT. §15A- 1415 (2001) (explaining
when a defendant mayassert a MAR and the appropriate grounds upon which the defendant may
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel because his trial counsel were ineffective in
their presentation of mental health testimony.' The state MAR court concluded
that Perkins was procedurally barred from raising the ineffective assistance of
counsel ("IAC*') claim under section 15A- 1419(a)(3) of North Carolina General
Statutes because he had not raised it on direct appeal." After the Pitt County
Superior Court denied Perkins's MAR, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
denied review.11
In September 1999 Perkins petitioned the federal district court for habeas
relief. 2 The State filed an answer and motion for summary judgment." In
March 2000 Perkins filed a motion requesting discoveryinto a claim that his trial
counsel were ineffective for failing to present properly mental health evidence.14
Perkins filed additional motions "for leave to proceed ex parte in moving for
expert assistance and.. . for funds to hire experts to pursue his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim." "5 The district court ruled that Perkins had proce-
durally defaulted federal habeas review of the IAC claim because the claim had
been procedurally barred in state court.1" The district court granted the State's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed Perkins's habeas petition.17
Perkins filed an application for a certificate of appealability ("ODA") which was
granted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.1
Il. Hdsg
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Perkins's
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 9 The court found that the district court did
do so); Perkins v. North Carolina, 522 US. 837, 837 (1997) (metm) (denying certioranr.
9. Peykir, 2003 WL 21729943, at *3; swUS. CONT. amend. VI (stating that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shallenjoythe right to "have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence");
Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 687 (1984) (stating that the defendant must show that
counsel's deficient performance was so greatlylacking that the defendant did not receive a reason-
able standard of care and competence guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense).
10. Peykirs, 2003 WL 21729943, at *3 (citing N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A- 1419(a)(3) (2001)).
11. Id at *2.




16. Perkim, 2003 WL 21729943,at *3;seN.C GEN.STAT. S 15A- 1419(a)(3) (2001) (explain-
ing when a state MAR court can deny relief).
17. Peyk/ir, 2003 WL 21729943, at *3.
18. Id at *1; se28 US.C. S 2253(c)(1) (2000) (stating that "[ulnless a circuit justice or judge
issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be talen to the court of appeals"; part of
AEDPA).
19. Peykim, 2003 WL 21729943, at *9.
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not err in ruling that Perkins procedurallydefaulted his IAC claim2 0 The Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court's decision that Perkins was not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing regarding the alleged juror misconduct claim rejected by
the state court." Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly
dismissed the claim that Perkins was denied the right to an impartial jury after a
juror was excluded based on his personal views on capital punishment.
IL A rlis
A. Pm r Default qFaleral Habea Rezew
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision that a federal
habeas court is prevented from reviewing claims that a state court declined to
review on the merits" 'pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural
rule... unless the [petitioner] can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that
failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.'
"23 An adequate state rule is one that is " 'firmly established and regularly or
consistently applied by the state court.' "24 A state rule is independent " 'if it
does not depend on a federal constitutional ruling.' "25 The district court ruled
that Perkins had procedurally defaulted his IAC claim pursuant to section 15A-
1419(a)(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes.26 The statute bars state court
review of claims if the defendant could have raised the claim on a previous appeal
but failed to do so.2 Section 15A- 1419(a) (3) does not provide an exception for
IAC claims.2" This rule does not prevent state courts from reviewing any claim
that was not brought on direct appeal.29 Rather, " 'the rule requires North
Carolina courts to determine whether the particular claim at issue could have
been brought on direct review.' "o If the claim could have been raised but was
not, it is procedurally barred in MAR proceedings.3 If the court determines that
20. Id at *6.
21. Id at *8.
22. Id at *9.
23. Id at *4 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 US. 722,750 (1991)).
24. Id (quoting Brown v. Lee, 319 F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir. 2003)).
25. Pikirs, 2003 WL 21729943, at *4 (quoting Bmu, 319 F.3d at 169).
26. Id; seN.C GEN. STAT. S 15A- 1419(a)(3) (2001) (discussingwhen a state MARcourt may
deny relie).
27. Pe kim, 2003 WL 21729943, at *4.
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id (quoting State v. Fair, 557 S.E.2d 500,525 (N.C 2001)).
31. S N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A- 1419(a)(3) (2001) (explaining when a state MAR court can
deny relief).
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a claim has been asserted on direct appeal prematurely, the claim will be dis-
missed without prejudice and may be reasserted at a subsequent MAR proceed-
ing.
Perkins argued that his IAC claim was not procedurally defaulted because
section 15A- 1419(a)(3) was not an independent and adequate state procedural
rule.33 Perkins claimed that the rule was not adequate because North Carolina
courts did not regularly and consistently apply the bar to IAC claims.34 As his
evidence, Perkins pointed to twenty-seven state court cases." In onlyone of the
twenty-seven cases did the MAR court refuse to apply the bar after the State
raised it because the defendant did not raise the claim on direct appeal. 6 The
MAR court applied the bar in four cases in which the State raised it as a
defense.37 In eight of the cases pointed to by Perkins, the State never raised the
bar at all.38 In the rest of the cases cited by Perkins, it was unclear whether the
bar was raised by the State.39 Perkins claimed that section 15A-1419(a)(3) was
not regularly and consistentlyapplied because the state courts reached the merits
in all but four of the cases."
The Fourth Circuit clarified that of the twenty-seven procedurallyanalogous
cases, the court can onlyconsider those in which the State actually raised the bar
as a defense.4 The court found that of the twenty-seven cases, there was only
one case in which the bar was raised but was not applied.42 In McCarer v Le,43
the Fourth Circuit held that for the petitioner
"to make a colorable showing that section 15A-1419(a)(3) ... [was]
not consistently and regularly applied to ineffective assistance claims,
he would need to cite a non-neligible number of cases in which
ineffective assistance claims couldave been brought on direct review
but were not and in which the collateral review court nonetheless
failed to bar tie claim under section 15A- 1419(a)(3) because the claim
was an ineffective assistance claim""
32. Perkis, 2003 WL 21729943, at *4 (quoting Fair, 557 S.El2d at 525).










43. 221 F.3d 583 (4th Or. 2000).
44. Petkirs, 2003 WL 21729943, at *5 (quoting McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 589 (4th ar.
2000)).
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The court held that this single deviation was not enough to find that North
Carolina courts had not regularly and consistently applied the procedural bar.45
The Fourth Circuit concluded that section 15A-1419(a)(3) is both independent
and adequate.'
Perkins failed to argue " 'cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law.' " 47 In addition, he did not demon-
strate that failure to consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim would
result in a " 'fundamental miscarriage of justice.' "41 Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit did not review the merits of Perkins's claim and affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Perkins's IAC claim on the grounds of procedural default.49
B. JurmrMiswrsa
Perkins also asserted that one or more of the jurors prematurely formed an
opinion as to his guilt and the appropriateness of the death penalty." At his trial,
Perkins made a motion to excuse a certain juror for cause and made a motion for
a mistrial." After questioning the specific juror, the rest of the jurors, and other
relevant witnesses, the trial judge determined that there had been no juror
misconduct.52 Perkins claimed that the denial of these motions violated his Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and to a fair and impartial
jury." On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, holding that the trial
45. I
46. id
47. Id at *4 (quoting Cdmv 501 U.S. at 750).
48. Id (quoting Cdmt 501 US. at 750).
49. la at *6.
50. Perins, 2003 WL 21729943, at *6.
51. Id. at *7.
52. Id Perkins claimed that at some point near the concusion of his case, juror Alecia Staton
("Staton") told her babysitter, Wendy Clark ("Clark*), that the jurors had already decided that
Perkins was guilty. Id at *6. Staton also allegedly told Clark that all but one juror agreed that the
death penalty was warranted. Id The trial judge brought Clark in for questioning. Id at *7. In
addition, all of the jurors denied having discussed, expressed, or formed an opinion about Perkins's
guilt or appropriate punishment. Id Staton denied that she had formed or expressed an opinion
as to guilt or punishment, and denied the alleged statements to dark Id
53. Id at *6; U.S.CO)T. amend. VI; U.S. COMST. amendXIV;s~eFullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d
663,678 (4th Cr. 2002) (setting forth the standard for habeas petitioners making a juror bias claim).
The Fu/uIXd court stated that "when a habeas petitioner bases a juror bias claim on improper
communication between, or improper influence exerted by, a nonjuror upon a juror... he 'must
first establish both that an unauthorized contact was made and that it was of such a character as to
reasonably draw into question the integrity of the verdict.' " Fudllur 290 F.3d at 678 (quoting
Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cr. 1988)).
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court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that there was no juror miscon-
duct, affirmed the trial court's ruling.5
Because the state court rejected this claim, Perkins needed to show that the
state court's adjudication of his claim resulted in" 'a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, dearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or was 'based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.'" 5 The Fourth Cucuit found that Perkins did not prove
that the state court's decision was "contraryto or an unreasonable application of
clearlyestablished law."' The court also found the state court's decision reason-
able in light of the facts presented at trialF There was no evidence adduced at
trial indicating that the juror in question was improperly influenced or made
aware of outside information."8 Under these facts, the Fourth Circuit found it
reasonable for the trial court to conclude that no improper juror conduct oc-
curred.
5 9
The Fourth Circuit also concluded that Perkins failed to show that he was
entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing into the alleged juror misconduct.'
When a habeas petitioner "has failed to develop the factual basis for a claim in
State court," he must meet certain requirements before a federal habeas court will
grant a hearing.61 The State did not claim that Perkins had failed to develop the
factual basis for his juror misconduct claim.62 Although 28 U.S.C S 2254(e)(2)
presented no bar to a hearing in this case, an evidentiary hearing is not
54. Perkis, 2003 WL21729943, at *7; seeState v. Bonney, 405 S.E.2d 145,152 (N.C. 1991)
(explaining that a trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless a clear showing exists that the
court abused its discretion).
55. Perkir, 2003 WL 21729943, at *6 (quoting 28 U.S.C S 2254(d) (2000)).
56. Id at *8; se 28 US.C S 2254(d) (discussing the grounds for granting a federal writ of
habeas corpus; part of AEDPA). It is interesting to note that in Part M of the opinion, the Fourth
Crcuit does not cite any United States Supreme Court cases. It is unclear whether there was no
federal law on point or whether the Fourth Circuit simply neglected to include relevant cases. If
there was no clearlyestablished federal law to apply, the Fourth Carcuit could have denied Perkins's
claim on that basis. The state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if there was no
federal law to apply.




61. Id; see28 U.S.C S 2254(e)(2) (stating that an evidentiaryhearing will onlybe held if "the
claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law," previously undiscovered fact, or if the applicant
can show "byclear and convincing evidence" that "no reasonable factfinder would have found the
applicant guilty"; part of AEDPA).
62. Pedkin, 2003 WL 21729943, at -8.
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automatic.63 A state prisoner must still allege" 'additional facts that, if true, would
entitle him to relief.' ,,64 Further, the Fourth (urcuit reiterated that the petitioner
must establish one of the six factors set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Toaunmd v Sair6
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly found that Perkins
had failed to establish any of the six Toumendfactors." Perkins did not point the
district court to any witnesses, testimony, or information that was not presented
in the state court. In addition, the Fourth Crcuit found that the trial court
"conducted a full and fair hearing" into the alleged juror misconduct claim.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny
Perkins an evidentiary hearing.69
C Deait Q4'iaic
Perkins's final claim before the Fourth Crcuit was that the trial court
impinged on his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury by
improperly dismissing a potential juror for cause based on his answers during
death qualification questioning.7° The trial court asked prospective juror William
Jackson ("Jackson") if his personal beliefs would prevent him from being able to
vote for a recommendation of the death penalty" Jackson responded that "he
did not 'know whether [he] could vote on the death penalty and was 'unable to
respond' to the question.""2 In Wamzmbt v Wzd 3 the United States Supreme
Court held that a potential juror maybe excused based on his personal views on
capital punishment if "the juror's views would prevent or substantiallyimpair the
63. Id
64. Id (quoting FuUi 4 290 F.3d at 681).
65. I d; se Townsend v. Sain, 372 US. 293, 313 (1963) (stating that "(a] federal court must
grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the
merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determina-
tion is not fairlysupported bythe record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed bythe
state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of
newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court
hearing; or (6) for anyreason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant
a full and fair fact hearing").




70. Id; swUS.CONT. amend. VI (stating that in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant has
the right to an impartial jury); US. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1 (stating that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
71. Pedeim, 2003 WL 21729943, at "9.
72. Id (quoting Pohikm, 481 S.E.2d at 30).
73. 469 US. 412 (1985).
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performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath."'74 The Fourth Circuit previously determined that the trial judge's assess-
ments of demeanor and credibility were " 'to be accorded a presumption of
correctness under 28 U.S.CA. S 2254(d).' "" If the juror's responses are vague
or otherwise unclear, the trial court's determination based on its observation of
the juror is " 'presumed to be consistent with the applicable standard.' 76
The Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that the trial judge, "who
was in a position to hear 'Jackson's tone of voice and observe[ ] his demeanor,'
did not err in excusing Jackson for cause."' The Fourth Circuit was unable to
say that the state court's adjudication of this claim" 'resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law,' or 'resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable deter-
mination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed-
ing.' ,," Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Perkins's final claim."'
IV. AppL26tw7m Vubmz
The first issue of interest arising fromPetki concerns the manner in which
a defendant can preserve an IAC claim for federal habeas review."0 Between
1985 and 1990, a Virginia statute permitted defendants to raise IAC claims on
direct appeal."1 The effect was to have cases similar to Perkim in which the
defendant defaulted habeas review because he did not raise the claim on direct
appeal.82 In 1990, the statute was repealed; defendants can no longer raise IAC
claims on direct appeal.8 3 The current Virginia rule ensures that an IACclaim can
74. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 US. 412,424 (1985).
75. Perkim, 2003 WL 21729943, at "9 (quoting Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407,415 (4th Car.
1991)); se 28 U.S.C S 2254(d) (2000) (stating when a writ of habeas corpus can be granted pursuant
to a state court decision).
76. Petkim, 2003 WL 21729943, at *9 (quoting Man=4 943 F.2d at 415).
77. Id (quoting Perkim, 481 S.E.2d at 30).
78. Id (quoting 28 US.C S 2254(d)).
79. Id
80. S id. at *3 (discussing the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
81. S&VA. CODE ANN. S 192-317.1 (vfchie 1985) (repealed 1990) (stating that a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel maybe raised on direct appeal if assigned as error and if all matters
relating to such issue are fully contained within the record of the triaD; Frye v. Commonwealth, 345
S.E.2d 267, 287 (Va. 1986) (discussing a defendant's attempt to argue ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal after the trial court denied the defendant's motion for new counsel to
handle the appeal.
82. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-317.1 (ichie 1985) (repealed 1990) (stating that a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel maybe raised on direct appeal if assigned as error and if all matters




always be raised in a state habeas proceeding.8' The lesson to be taken from
Perkim is that attorneys should be very aware of procedural default rules. In
Virginia, a defendant must raise his IAC claim in the state habeas proceeding to
avoid procedural default in federal habeas review."5 Attorneys must also antici-
pate that the federal issues will be different in a Virginia case. In Perk/v, the
federal habeas court focused its inquiry on whether the North Carolina MAR
court invoked an "independent and adequate" state rule for procedurallybarring
the IAC claim.86 In a Virginia case, the federal habeas court will require a defen-
dant to show cause for not raising his IAC claim in state habeas court and to
show that he suffered "actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of
federal law."' 7
The second issue of interest concerns the death qualification questioning of
jurors. Perkins argued that it was improper for the trial court to dismiss juror
Jackson based on his responses to questions concerning whether he could "vote"
for the death penalty" The Fourth Crcuit upheld the decision bythe Supreme
Court of North Carolina to affirm the trial court's dismissal of the juror." Yet,
when taken in context with Jackson's other responses, it is at least possible that
Jackson believed he would be able to return a guilty verdict notwithstanding the
possibilityof the death penalty.* The United States Supreme Court has held that
a juror's bias need not be proven with unmistakable clarity.' Therefore, in cases
in which a juror's responses during death qualification are ambiguous or contra-
dictory, the court does not need to find with unmistakable clarity that the juror
is biased against the death penalty The court may determine, regardless of
responses to the contrary, that the juror's views "would prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction
84. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-654(C)(1) (ichie 2000) (stating "(w]ith respect to anysuch
petition filed by a petitioner held under the sentence of death... the Supreme Court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to consider and award writs of habeas corpus").
85. Id
86. Perkim, 2003 WL 21729943, at *4.
87. CQir4 501 US. at 750 (stating that a federal habeas court will not review a state court's
decision to deny a claim unless the petitioner can show"cause for the default and actual prejudice").
88. Pe,kzm, 2003 WL 21729943, at '9; sePeykim, 481 S.E.2d at 43 (recounting testimonyin
which the juror stated that he could folow the law and vote for a guilty verdict if he was satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt).
89. Petkim, 2003 WL 21729943, at "9.
90. See Pk i, 481 S.E2d at 43 (discussing the death qualification of a prospective juror).
91. Se Wainaigb 469 U.S. at 424 (holding that the standard for determining when a
prospective juror may be excluded for cause based on his views on capital punishment does not
require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity).
92. See United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273,296 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing how a juror's
conflicting responses were enough to convince the court that his views would prevent or substan-
tially impair the performance of his duties).
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and his oath."" Virginia courts may not empanel jurors if there is a reasonable
doubt as to their impartiaity.9" Attorneys should be aware that a court may
excuse a juror based on an indication that the juror will not vote for death, even
if the juror's other responses indicate that he will follow the law.
In WItdxnp Illios,95 the United States Supreme Court stated that it is
improper to exclude jurors for cause "simply because theyvoiced general objec-
tions to the death penaltyor expressed conscientious or religious scruples against
its infliction." 6 The Court stated that "tlhe most that can be demanded of a
venireman... is that he be willing to comider all of the penalties provided by state
law."97 The Supreme Court clarified its Wtd-sp00n decision when it decided the
case of Wainuinbt u Wn.9" When read together, Wd enpoon and Wit suggest
that the relevant inquiryis whether the prospective juror can comider both life and
death." Voir dire questions that require prospective jurors to say whether they
could "vote" for death may eliminate constitutionally eligible jurors.'0° Instead,
defense attorneys should steer prospective jurors toward a determination of
whether they could "consider" both life and death. Life jurors may be seated,
even if they admit that they are reluctant to 'mte for death, as long as theyconcede
that they could ax ider death. A prospective juror may be seated as long as his
views on capital punishment do not" 'prevent or substantiallyinipair the perfor-
mance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'
"101 Thus, to prevent the dismissal of potential life jurors, voir dire questions
should be phrased in a manner that assesses whether the juror can "consider"
both life and death.
In Perkin, the trial court also asked jurors whether they felt theycould vote
for a "nwmhadctof death."02 In 0d4ued v Mississipi,0 3 the Supreme Court
held that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty when jurors are led
93. Id (quoting Waimrmf 469 U.S. at 424).
94. See Damien P. DeLaney, Case Note, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 145, 146 (2001) (analyzing Green
v. Commonwealth, 546 S.E.2d 446 (Va. 2001)).
95. 391 US. 510 (1968).
96. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510,522 (1968).
97. Id at 522 n.21.
98. Se Wa&i=t, 469 US. at 424 (clarifying Widxnpoo by affirmatively stating that the
proper standard for examining the exclusion of a juror for cause is whether the juror's views impair
his abilixyto perform his duties).
99. Id
100. SeeMeghan H Morgan, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 221 (2003) (analyzing United States
v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2003)).
101. Waoiq4 469 U.S. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
102. Perkir, 481 S.E.2d at 43 (emphasis added).
103. 472 US. 320 (1985).
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to believe that ultimate sentencing responsibility lies elsewhere.'" The Court
stated that "the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate
determination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger that
the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role.""'5 In the
federal system, the jury's verdict is not a recommendation at all. 18 U.S.C S 3594
states that "[upon a recommendation... that the defendant should be sentenced
to death... the court sha/! sentence the defendant accordingly.""° According to
the language of S 3594, it is clearly improper to ask a federal jury if they would
be able to "recommend" death.107 In the Virginia death penaltysystem, the jury's
sentencing recommendation is in fact a recommendation. 08 Virginia Code
section 19.2-264.5 requires a post-sentence report "[w]hen the punishment of any
person has been fixed at death" so that the court "may be fully advised as to
whether the sentence of death is appropriate and just.""o After consideration of
the post-sentence report, the court mayset aside the death sentence and impose
life imprisonment."' Yet, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that under both
Virginia law and the rule announced in Cud, "it is improper for the juryto be
told that the trial judge shares the responsibility for the death sentence."11' It is
improper for the Commonwealth to characterize the jury's verdict as a "reco m -
mendation" because it minimizes the jury's sense of responsibility in imposing
a death sentence in violation of CQakid#. ' Defense attorneys should use Giludl
and Frye to object to death qualification questions which lead jurors to believe
that a sentence is merely a recommendation and that the ukimate responsibility
for imposing death lies elsewhere.
By following the holdings of Wspom and its progeny, defense attorneys
can avoid situations proscribed by CaUd. Death qualification questions that
require jurors to "consider" life and death do not violate Cadud. If attorneys
stray from Wtdxnpoct and ask jurors whether theycan "vote" for death, vote for
a "recommendation" of death, or even consider a "recommendation" of death,
104. Caldwell v. Mississippi. 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
105. Id at 333.
106. 18 U.S.C S 3594 (2000) (emphasis added).
107. See id (stating that "the court shall" sentence the defendant to death in accordance with
the jury's verdict).
108. See VA. CODE ANN. S 191-264.5 (Michie 2000) (stating that a post- sentence report shall
be prepared when a defendant's sentence has been fixed at death).
109. Id
110. Id
111. Frye v. Commonweakh, 345 S.E.2d 267,286 (Va. 1986) (explaining that the use of the
term "recommendation" byprosecutors and other similar comments describing the jury's sentenc-
ing dutyare misleading because theyminimize the juWy's sense of responsibility or imposing death).
112. Id; see Cak/d, 472 U.S. at 333 (stating that "the uncorrected suggestion that the
responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable
danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role").
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they run the risk of violating Cildud. Defense attorneys should consciously
phrase voir dire questions to prevent the dismissal of life jurors and to followthe
Supreme Court's ruling in CGa/1du. In addition, defense attorneys should object




Virginia attorneys should be aware of three i ortant issues addressed by
Perk/re. First, attorneys must raise their clients' ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on state habeas to avoid procedurally defaulting the claim on federal
habeas review. Second, death qualification questions should be aimed at deter-
mining whether a juror is able to aczider both life and death. Finally, attorneys
should object to death qualification questions that describe the sentence by the
jury as a mere "recommendation" because it minimizes the jury's sense of
responsibility for imposing the death sentence.""
Jessie A Seiden
113. See Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 547 S.E.2d 186,197 (Va. 2000) (stating that a defendant
must object to an improper question posed bythe trial judge during voir dire and that the objection
must be "stated in a timely manner with reference to the precise question at issue").
114. Se CzA& ,4 72 U.S. at 333 (stating that the importance of the juWy's role in sentencing
a defendant to death should not be minimized).
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